Faith and reason

I           Introduction:  In theological circle the axis of the discussion revolving around the concept of faith has something to do with its relation to the notion of faith.  This tension is especially evident where God’s existence is itself at issue.  We will briefly look into the relationship of these two notions.

II          Faith:  The centrality of faith for Christianity dates from the New Testament itself, where ‘believers’ often occurs as a short-hand term for those living according to the apostolic teaching (Acts 10:45) and ‘the faith’ for all that would later be termed  ‘Christianity’ (Acts 6:7 etc).

             1              Definition of faith:  The only actual biblical definition of faith (Heb.11:1) does not encapsulate all that the Bible says on the subject, but indicates its main features: ‘the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen.’  It is a confident, obedient trust in the reality, power and love of God known through his acts, and an awaiting of their future consummation.

             2              Faith in OT:  The Bible contains a variety of emphases within this overall view.  The noun, ‘faith’ is comparatively rare in the OT, where (e.g., Hab.2:5) it may indicate ‘faithfulness’ or ‘loyalty’ to God rather than purely passive reliance. But dependence on God as distinct from human powers was important for Isaiah (Isa.7:9; 30:15), and while the OT so often sees faith centralized as obedient action (Deut.6:1ff.), the note of trust also resounds, especially in the Psalms.

             3              Faith in NT:

                             (a)          Synoptic Gospels:  In the Synoptic Gospels, those who respond to Jesus’ proclamation of the kingdom and believe in his salvific powers are commended for their faith (Mk.2:5; 5:34).

                             (b)          Johannine writings:  In the Johannine writings a somewhat more reflective or even creedal note appears: belief that Jesus is Son of God in the flesh (Jn.20:31; 1 Jn.5:1).

                             (c)           Pauline thought:  For Paul, faith is the utter reliance on God’s grace, of the man who knows that he cannot attain righteousness (justification) by works of the law, but only by union with Christ, crucified and his righteousness.

III         Tensions in the understanding of faith:  Faith being so central in Christian thought, yet comprising several layers of meaning, the theological tradition has produced certain tensions in its understanding. Thus:

             1              Faith by which we believe and the faith which we believe:    Either the subjectivity of the believer, or the objectivity of that to which his faith attaches, is liable to emphasis at the expense of the other.  Some theologians (e.g. Soren Kierkagaard) stressed the subjectivity of faith as decision.  But some argued that stressing faith’s subjectivity would mean nothing but to lose sight of the reality of the God in whom faith rests.  Faith is passionate precisely because of the holiness and grace of God whom it apprehends.

             2              Faith as human decision and faith as divine gift:  Faith being man’s response to divine initiative, human decision, trust and understanding are involved.  But much theology (especially Reformed) has also attributed faith to the creation of God through the Holy Spirit.  Both emphases are necessary, otherwise faith is seen: (a) as a human activity independent of God and loses the sense of grace, or (b) as a mechanical operation of God subverting the human will.  The paradox can be viewed as analogous to human inter-personal relationship where both freedom and dependency operate in the grace of love.

IV        Tensions between faith and other elements:  There are also tensions between faith and other elements of Christian awareness, particularly between faith and reason.  Thus:

             1              Antagonism:  Some thinkers define the relation between faith and reason as one of antagonism.  Some of these thinkers maintain that human reason has become completely unreliable as a source of knowledge about God.  Modern thinkers, viz., Hume, Kant, Kierkegaard, all agree that reason must be set aside in order to allow for faith.

             2              Harmonious relation:  Some thinkers contend that the relation between reason and faith is one of harmony, if not identification.  For some, this means that faith flows from the reasoning process.  But there are some who maintain that a reliance on human reason necessitates giving up on the notion of faith altogether.

             3              Reason on basis of faith:  This view asserts that reason can only operate on the basis of certain faith commitments or within certain revelatory frameworks.  The idea here is that once the basic truth about God/Christ has been given and received we can and must use reason to comprehend its meaning and implications.  This was the view of Augustine, who said, “I believe in order to understand.”

             4              Separation without inequality:  This view sees that relation between reason and faith as one of separation without inequality.  It is possible to view reason as providing, even though limited knowledge of God on the nature of the universe and on human moral experience, while at the same time allowing faith to serve as the proper response to God’s self-disclosure.  Aquinas, for instance, claimed that all people can know that God exists, as well as something about God’s power, wisdom and goodness by reason alone, but that we only know who God is by means of revelation received through faith.  The modern proponents of this view are William Temple, Austin Forrer, John Smith and B. Lonergan.

V          Conclusion:  We have seen the tension between faith and reason in relation to God’s existence in particular.  Some thinkers, especially the Reformers, view the human intellect as involved in the fallenness of man and therefore, drastically restricted the scope of reason.  Then a number of modern theologians, both Catholic and Protestant, would view faith as neither dependent on nor contrary to reason, but as a commitment to a view of ultimate reality, regarding which reason by itself is neutral.